Secular1: in classical/medieval times, temporal or earthly things (which presupposes a sacred/secular divide).
Secular2: “a nonsectarian, neutral, and areligious space or standpoint.” (Which presupposes such a stance is possible.) Here, people grow disenchanted with religion, believing it to be irrational and divisive, and argue it is possible to “be governed by universal, neutral rationality.”
Secular3: Here, “religious belief or belief in God is understood to be one option among others, and thus contestable (and contested). At issue here is a shift in ‘conditions of belief.’”
He believes we inhabit a Secular3 age that masquerades as a Secular2 age. It claims neutrality and poses as a natural shift away from religion that brings a positive benefit. Being secular is “not just unbelief,” however. “The emergence of the secular is also bound up with the production of a new option—the possibility of exclusive humanism as a viable social imaginary—a way of constructing meaning and significance without any reference to the divine or transcendence.” Our underlying framework has changed. So what happened?
In medieval times, Taylor argues its social imaginary contained three things:
- “The natural world was constituted as a cosmos that functioned . . . as a sign that pointed beyond itself, to what was more than nature.”
- “Society itself was understood as something grounded in a higher reality; earthly kingdoms were grounded in a heavenly kingdom.”
- “People lived in an enchanted world, a world ‘charged’ with presences, that was open and vulnerable, not closed and self-sufficient.”
- “Disenchantment and the ‘Buffered’ Modern Self.” Things have natural causes/explanations, it’s more about our mind and interpretation, and we are insulated/isolated.
- “Living Social.” Individuals “are the locus of meaning . . . [so] disbelief no longer has social consequences.”
- “The carnival is over: ‘Lowering the Bar’ for Flourishing.” Instead of “trying to maintain an equilibrium between the demands of creaturely life and the expectations for eternal life,” the modern age says “you can stop being burdened by what eternity/salvation demands and simply frame ultimate flourishing within this world.”
- “The Fullness of Time.” There used to be the notion that “time is transcended by ‘higher’ time” which is “not merely chronological or linear.” But here, “nothing ‘higher’ impinges on our calendars—only the tick-tock of chronos, and the self-imposed burdens of our ‘projects.’”
- “From Cosmos to Universe.” “The shift from cosmos to universe—from ‘creation’ to ‘nature’—makes it possible to now imagine meaning and significance as contained within the universe itself, and autonomous, independent ‘meaning’ that is unhooked from any sort of transcendent narrative.”
- A shift away from “a sense of obligation ‘beyond’ human flourishing” [Christians say “thy will be done” of God] to “a new emphasis: providence is primarily about ordering this world for mutual benefit, particularly economic benefit.”
- A shift away from needing grace to “we can figure this out without assistance.”
- A shift away from God’s inscrutability/mysterious ways to “mystery can no longer be tolerated.”
- A shift away from the idea that God is transforming us (making all things new!). “We lose the sense that humanity’s end transcends its current configurations . . .”
He sees the shift in religion, too. To a view that God is impersonal and inactive.
What do these shifts mean in aggregate? It has changed “what we take for granted.”
Aside: we all live with “an unchallenged framework” that “becomes part of the background that governs our being-in-the-world.” And that “our ‘take’ is not something reasoned to as much as it is something we reason from.” All of us live with basic orientations that (no matter how seemingly ‘neutral’) are value-laden. What do you consider uncontestable (or uncritically accept)? That is a clue to your framework. Nobody is intellectually independent; we all serve some authority, even if we don’t recognize it.
Where are we today? The shifts mentioned above have produced a different imaginary (what Taylor calls “exclusive humanism”). And yet “Our secular age is [not] an age of disbelief; it’s an age of believing otherwise. We can’t tolerate living in a world without meaning. So if the transcendence that previously gave significance to the world is lost, we need a new account of meaning—a new ‘imaginary’ that enables us to imagine a meaningful life within this now self-sufficient universe of gas and fire.” And while some “assume that this is just ‘the way things are,’ in fact what we take for granted is contingent and contestable.” And we all contest it, in our own way, as we sense something has been lost. “’We moderns’ are not entirely comfortable with modernity.”
So we live in a time “where ‘the secular’ and ‘the religious’ haunt each other in a mutual dance of displacement and decentering.” Indeed, “our age is haunted. On the one hand, we live under a brass heaven, ensconced in immanence. We live in the twilight of both gods and idols. But their ghosts have refused to depart, and every once in a while we might be surprised to find ourselves tempted by belief, by intimations of transcendence . . . on the other hand, even as faith endures in our secular age, believing doesn’t come easy. Faith is fraught; confession is haunted by an inescapable sense of its contestability. We don’t believe instead of doubting; we believe while doubting. We’re all Thomas now.”
What is the result of this mutual haunting? A “nova effect”—“an explosion of options for finding (or creating) ‘significance’” because “all sorts of people find themselves caught” in “’cross-pressures’—pushed by the immanence of disenchantment on one side, but also pushed by a sense of significance and transcendence on another side, even if it might be a lost transcendence.” This book’s ultimate argument “is that most of live in this cross-pressured space, where both our agnosticism and our devotion are mutually haunted and haunting.” We have “doubt and longing, faith and questioning.”
Where to from here? How should the Christian respond? Perhaps not by focusing on evidence or data (which in a sense concedes the game and points to human reason as the highest ideal) “but rather to offer an alternative story that offers a more robust, complex understanding of the Christian faith”. Ultimately “the appeal is to a ‘sense,’ a feel for things.” “It is not demonstrable except insofar as it offers a better account of our experience.”









